Who Is John Finnis?
John Finnis is an Australian legal philosopher and one of the most influential modern defenders of natural-law theory. He is Professor Emeritus of Law and Legal Philosophy at the University of Oxford and Biolchini Family Emeritus Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame.
His 1980 book Natural Law and Natural Rights helped revive natural-law thinking within contemporary philosophy and legal scholarship. His work has influenced philosophers and legal scholars including Robert P. George, Patrick Lee, Gerard Bradley, and Neil Gorsuch.
Natural-Law Theory
Natural-law theory holds that certain moral truths can be discovered through human reason. Morality is not simply created by personal preference, majority opinion, or government authority.
Finnis identifies several basic human goods that contribute to human flourishing, including:
- Life
- Knowledge
- Friendship and community
- Play
- Appreciation of beauty
- Practical reason
- Religion or reflection on ultimate questions
These goods are valuable in themselves, not merely as tools for achieving something else. Moral reasoning requires respecting these goods in oneself and in other people.
The Basic Good of Life
Finnis considers human life a basic good. This means life should not be treated merely as an instrument that may be deliberately destroyed whenever doing so produces desired consequences.
The good of life applies to human beings regardless of their age, health, intelligence, independence, or social usefulness. It therefore includes human beings during embryonic and fetal development.
Finnis does not argue that preserving physical life is the only moral consideration or that life must be prolonged by every possible means. Rather, he argues that directly intending the death of an innocent person is fundamentally different from accepting death as an unintended consequence of a morally justified act.
His Argument Against Abortion
Finnis’s position can be summarized as follows:
- Human life is a basic good worthy of protection.
- The unborn child is a living human individual.
- Basic human worth does not depend upon present consciousness, independence, or social recognition.
- Abortion ordinarily involves choosing the unborn child’s death as an intended means or outcome.
- Therefore, abortion ordinarily violates the basic good of human life.
His argument does not require the unborn child to be currently capable of reasoning or making choices. Human beings possess radical or foundational capacities rooted in what they are, even before those capacities can be exercised.
Equal Human Worth
Finnis rejects the idea that basic human worth depends upon a person’s present performance. Intelligence, self-awareness, health, and independence vary greatly among human beings and can be temporarily lost.
If these abilities determine the right to life, then stronger or more capable people could possess greater fundamental rights than infants, unconscious patients, or people with cognitive disabilities.
Finnis instead grounds human equality in our shared humanity. Development changes what a human being can do, but it does not create a new kind of being.
Response to the Famous Violinist
In “The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion,” Finnis directly responds to Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Famous Violinist argument.
Thomson argues that even if the fetus is a person, a woman may refuse the use of her body, just as someone may disconnect from a stranger who has been attached to that person’s body without permission.
Finnis argues that this analogy does not adequately describe abortion. In his view:
- Abortion usually involves intentionally bringing about the child’s death, not simply refusing assistance.
- Pregnancy involves a relationship between parent and child rather than two unrelated strangers.
- Bodily control is an important right but does not include an unlimited right to intentionally kill.
- A person’s responsibilities may be shaped by relationships, circumstances, and duties to dependent people.
Finnis therefore maintains that Thomson’s argument does not establish a general right to abortion, even if it demonstrates that bodily rights are morally important.
Intention and Double Effect
A central part of Finnis’s moral philosophy is the distinction between intending harm and foreseeing harm as an unintended consequence.
For example, a doctor may provide necessary treatment to save a pregnant woman’s life even when the child’s death is foreseen and cannot be prevented. The doctor’s purpose is to treat the dangerous condition, not to use the child’s death as the means of solving it.
Finnis argues that this differs morally from an abortion in which fetal death is intended as either the goal or the means of ending the pregnancy. This reasoning is closely connected to the principle of double effect.
Law and Morality
Finnis does not claim that every immoral action should be prohibited by law. Laws must consider the common good, enforceability, individual rights, and the consequences of governmental action.
However, he argues that law cannot remain entirely neutral about fundamental human goods. Laws necessarily express judgments about which people deserve protection and which actions may be permitted.
If unborn children are human beings with equal dignity, excluding them from legal protection requires moral justification. Merely labeling abortion a private choice does not resolve that underlying question.
Major Works
| Work | Significance |
|---|---|
| Natural Law and Natural Rights | Finnis’s foundational explanation of natural law, basic human goods, justice, authority, and rights |
| “The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion” | A major philosophical response to Judith Jarvis Thomson’s bodily-rights argument |
| Fundamentals of Ethics | Explains moral reasoning, human action, intention, and responsibility |
| Moral Absolutes | Defends the view that certain choices, including directly killing innocent people, are always morally wrong |
| Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory | Examines the natural-law thought of Thomas Aquinas and its relevance to modern ethics and law |
Influence
Finnis provided much of the philosophical foundation upon which later natural-law scholars developed the substance view and modern arguments for unborn human equality.
Patrick Lee and Robert P. George apply related reasoning more directly to embryos, personal identity, and bioethics. Francis Beckwith and Christopher Kaczor make similar ideas accessible within the abortion debate. Scott Klusendorf translates many of these principles into concise arguments for public advocacy.
Finnis’s distinctive contribution is the larger moral framework: human life is one of several basic goods, every human being deserves equal respect, and innocent human life must never be intentionally destroyed as a means to another goal.