Michael Tooley

Who Is Michael Tooley?

Michael Tooley is a philosopher and Professor Emeritus at the University of Colorado Boulder. His broader academic work covers metaphysics, causation, time, epistemology, philosophy of religion, and ethics.

Within the abortion debate, he is best known for his highly controversial 1972 essay, “Abortion and Infanticide.” Tooley argues that neither biological humanity nor the potential to develop mature abilities is sufficient for a serious right to life.

The Self-Consciousness Requirement

Tooley argues that an organism possesses a serious right to life only if it understands itself as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states.

In simpler terms, a being must have some awareness that:

  • “I” exist as a distinct individual.
  • I existed in the past.
  • I can continue to exist in the future.
  • Things can happen to me over time.

This requires more than basic consciousness or the ability to feel pain. It requires self-consciousness, meaning an awareness of oneself as a continuing individual.

Rights and Desires

Tooley connects rights with desires. He argues that a person’s right to something is generally connected to that person’s interest in or desire for it.

Under this reasoning, a right to continued life depends upon being capable of wanting oneself to continue existing. Killing a self-conscious person frustrates that person’s desire to remain alive.

An embryo, fetus, or newborn cannot understand itself as a continuing individual and cannot form a desire for its own future existence. Tooley therefore concludes that these human beings do not yet possess a serious right to life.

His Argument About Abortion

Tooley’s reasoning can be summarized as follows:

  1. A serious right to life requires self-consciousness and the capacity to desire one’s continued existence.
  2. Embryos and fetuses are not self-conscious.
  3. They cannot understand themselves as continuing subjects or desire their own future existence.
  4. Therefore, they do not possess a serious right to life.
  5. Abortion is consequently not generally a violation of someone’s right to life.

Unlike bodily-autonomy arguments, Tooley’s position does not merely claim that a woman may refuse the use of her body. He argues that the unborn child does not yet possess the kind of right that abortion would violate.

Abortion and Infanticide

Tooley openly recognizes that birth does not immediately produce self-consciousness. A newborn cannot form plans for the future or understand himself or herself as a continuing subject.

He therefore argues that abortion and infanticide cannot be separated simply by appealing to birth. Under his capacity-based standard, neither a fetus nor a young infant possesses a serious right to life.

Tooley does not claim that killing infants is always desirable or socially acceptable. His philosophical claim is that the infant’s own psychological capacities do not yet provide a strong right against being killed. This remains one of the most controversial implications of his position.

Temporary Unconsciousness

A common objection asks whether Tooley’s theory would permit killing adults who are asleep, under anesthesia, or temporarily unconscious.

Tooley distinguishes these people from embryos and infants. A sleeping or temporarily unconscious adult has already developed self-consciousness, possesses continuing mental structures, and may have formed desires about future existence before becoming unconscious.

An embryo or newborn has never developed those concepts or desires. Tooley therefore argues that temporarily losing consciousness is different from never having acquired self-consciousness.

Critics respond that this distinction makes a person’s current right to life depend partly upon past mental activity. It remains unclear why the same individual’s future capacity should matter after consciousness has been exercised but not before it first appears.

Potential Personhood

Tooley rejects the argument that an unborn child has a right to life because the child will naturally develop self-consciousness.

He distinguishes between:

  • An actual person: Someone who already possesses the relevant psychological capacities.
  • A potential person: An organism that may develop those capacities later.

Tooley argues that possessing the potential to become a person does not provide the same rights as already being one. Otherwise, he contends, it may become difficult to explain why gametes or other biological materials capable of contributing to a future person do not have comparable protection.

The pro-life response is that an embryo is not merely biological material that might contribute to a future human being. The embryo is already a distinct human organism actively developing himself or herself. Sperm and egg cells are parts of other organisms, while the embryo is the new organism whose mature abilities will later be exercised.

The Pro-Life Critique

It Excludes Newborn Children

Tooley’s view excludes newborns from a serious right to life because they are not self-conscious. Pro-life critics argue that any standard permitting the intentional killing of infants has failed to protect the most vulnerable members of the human family.

Tooley accepts much of this implication rather than creating an exception based solely on birth. This makes his position logically more consistent than some capacity theories, but also reveals the serious consequences of grounding rights in mental performance.

It Undermines Equal Human Rights

Self-consciousness exists in degrees and develops over time. If greater self-consciousness produces stronger rights, it becomes difficult to explain why more intellectually developed people do not possess greater fundamental worth than others.

The pro-life view grounds equality in shared human nature rather than unequal levels of psychological development.

It Confuses a Desire with the Subject Who Has It

A person must first exist before that person can develop desires. Pro-life philosophers argue that the human being is the subject who later becomes conscious, not a different organism replaced by a person when consciousness appears.

An unborn child does not need to desire continued existence before death can harm that child. Death permanently prevents the same individual from developing, forming relationships, making choices, and experiencing the future.

It Creates an Unclear Threshold

Self-consciousness does not suddenly appear at one easily identifiable moment. It develops gradually through infancy and childhood.

This creates practical and philosophical questions:

  • How much self-awareness is required?
  • How can it be measured?
  • At what age does the right to life begin?
  • Does the strength of the right increase as self-awareness develops?
  • What happens when self-consciousness is permanently diminished?

Critics argue that these questions show the danger of tying basic rights to abilities that vary among individuals.

Tooley Versus the Substance View

Tooley’s capacity-based viewSubstance or endowment view
A right to life depends upon self-consciousnessA right to life belongs to every human being
The ability to desire continued existence is morally centralSomeone can be harmed by death without presently understanding or desiring the future
Embryos and newborns are potential personsEmbryos and newborns are actual human beings at immature stages
Rights appear after psychological developmentBasic rights begin when the human individual begins to exist
Biological humanity alone is insufficientShared humanity grounds equal dignity

Importance in the Abortion Debate

Tooley is important because he presents an unusually direct and consistent version of capacity-based personhood. Rather than claiming that birth automatically creates personhood, he follows the psychological standard beyond birth and acknowledges its implications for newborn children.

His work forces the debate to confront a foundational question: Does the right to life belong to human beings because of what they are, or only after they become capable of understanding and desiring their own continued existence?

Major Works

WorkSignificance
“Abortion and Infanticide”Presents Tooley’s self-consciousness requirement and argues that abortion and infanticide may be morally permissible
Abortion and InfanticideExpands his analysis of personhood, potentiality, abortion, and the right to life
“Abortion” in The Cambridge Companion to Life and DeathReexamines arguments about fetal moral status and the potential to develop higher mental capacities
Time, Tense, and CausationA major work reflecting Tooley’s broader scholarship in metaphysics