Who Is Jeff McMahan?
Jeff McMahan is an American moral philosopher known for his work on personal identity, abortion, infanticide, euthanasia, animal ethics, and the ethics of war. He served as White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford from 2014 to 2025 and is now an emeritus professor.
His most important contribution to the abortion debate appears in his 2002 book, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. McMahan develops a capacity-based account in which the moral seriousness of killing depends partly on the individual’s mental development and psychological relationship with his or her future.
The Embodied-Mind View
McMahan argues that each of us is essentially an “embodied mind,” rather than a human organism considered as a whole. Under this view, the human organism begins at fertilization, but the individual who will eventually think, feel, and remember does not begin to exist until the fetal brain can support consciousness.
This means McMahan does not deny that an embryo is a living human organism. Instead, he argues that the embryo is not yet the same kind of being that you and I essentially are because it does not yet have a functioning mind.
Time-Relative Interests
McMahan’s best-known idea is the Time-Relative Interest Account. According to this theory, the harm caused by death depends partly on how psychologically connected an individual is to the future life he or she loses.
An adult normally has memories, plans, relationships, desires, and expectations that connect the present person strongly to the future person. An early fetus has not yet developed these psychological connections. McMahan therefore argues that death generally harms an early fetus less than it harms an older child or adult, even though the fetus would otherwise have had an entire life ahead.
As consciousness and psychological connections develop, the fetus’s interest in continuing to live becomes stronger. McMahan’s account therefore treats moral status as developing gradually rather than appearing in full at fertilization or birth.
His View of Abortion
McMahan argues that early abortion is morally similar in some respects to contraception because, according to his embodied-mind view, the conscious individual who could later exist has not yet begun to exist. The early human organism is alive, but McMahan does not believe it is yet “one of us” in the identity-bearing sense.
Later abortion is more morally serious because a developed fetus may be conscious and possess some interest in continuing to live. Nevertheless, McMahan argues that this interest is usually weaker than the interests of an older child or adult because the fetus has relatively little psychological connection to its future.
Consequently, his argument for abortion does not depend entirely on bodily autonomy. It also rests on his claim that the fetus has a weaker moral status and a weaker interest in continued life.
His View of Infanticide
McMahan rejects the idea that birth produces an immediate and fundamental change in an individual’s intrinsic moral status. A premature infant and a fetus of the same developmental age may have similar mental capacities. He therefore argues that it is difficult to defend later abortion while claiming that infanticide could never be permissible under any circumstances.
McMahan has concluded that infanticide could be permissible in a limited range of exceptional cases for reasons similar to those used to justify some later abortions. He does not claim that newborn infants have no moral value or that infanticide is generally acceptable. Newborns are conscious, can suffer, and have at least some interest in continuing to live. Their relationships with parents and others also provide additional moral reasons to protect them.
Nevertheless, his willingness to permit infanticide in certain cases is among the most controversial implications of his philosophy.
How McMahan Differs from Peter Singer
| Jeff McMahan | Peter Singer |
|---|---|
| Emphasizes personal identity, psychological connection, and time-relative interests | Emphasizes preferences, sentience, and the overall consequences of an action |
| Describes moral status and the harm of death as developing gradually | Commonly distinguishes persons from beings that are conscious but not self-aware |
| Argues that weak psychological connection makes death less harmful to a fetus or newborn | Argues that beings without self-awareness generally lack a person’s preference for continued existence |
| Accepts that infanticide may be permissible only in a limited range of circumstances | Has more directly defended the permissibility of ending some newborn lives, particularly in cases involving serious disability |
Pro-Life Response
The central pro-life objection is that McMahan separates the human individual from the living human organism. From fertilization onward, the embryo is already a complete, developing human organism. The embryo does not later become a new organism when consciousness appears. Rather, the same individual develops a brain, becomes conscious, is born, and matures into an adult.
Pro-life thinkers therefore argue that consciousness marks the development of an existing human being, not the beginning of a new one.
McMahan’s theory also makes protection depend partly on psychological development. Psychological abilities vary greatly among fetuses, newborns, children, adults, people with profound cognitive disabilities, and people with dementia. If stronger mental abilities produce a stronger right to life, equal human rights become difficult to maintain.
McMahan answers that an adult who is sleeping, unconscious, or temporarily incapacitated retains a developed psychological structure and history. However, critics argue that this still makes human worth depend on mental performance, past or present, rather than on what the individual fundamentally is.
The pro-life substance view offers a different foundation: every human being has equal basic worth because every human being is the same kind of being, regardless of age, location, dependency, disability, or current ability to exercise mental capacities.
Why He Matters to the Abortion Debate
McMahan provides one of the most detailed philosophical defenses of gradual moral status. His work is important because it follows capacity-based reasoning beyond abortion and openly examines what that reasoning may imply for newborns, people with serious cognitive disabilities, animals, and patients near the end of life.
His philosophy exposes a central disagreement in the abortion debate: whether human rights belong equally to every human being or depend on the development of particular mental abilities.
Major Works
| Work | Relevance |
|---|---|
| The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life | Develops McMahan’s embodied-mind view, Time-Relative Interest Account, and positions on abortion and infanticide |
| “Infanticide” | Examines whether commonly accepted views about abortion can be consistently separated from the morality of killing newborns |
| “Infanticide and Moral Consistency” | Argues that positions on abortion, infanticide, and killing animals produce difficult questions about moral consistency |
| Killing in War | Applies McMahan’s wider theories of responsibility, rights, and permissible killing to warfare |