What Is Population Ethics?
Population ethics studies moral questions involving people whose existence or identity depends on the choices being evaluated.
It asks questions such as:
- Is creating a happy person morally good?
- Is there a duty to have children?
- Is preventing someone from existing the same as harming that person?
- Should society maximize total well being or average well being?
- How should the quality and quantity of human lives be compared?
- What obligations do present generations have toward future generations?
These questions arise in debates about reproduction, abortion, embryo selection, genetic screening, climate policy, public health, and existential risks.
Major Approaches
The Total View
The total view holds that the better population is the one containing the greatest total amount of well being.
Under this view, adding people whose lives are worth living can make the world better, even if the average quality of life decreases.
This can lead to what philosopher Derek Parfit called The Repugnant Conclusion: an enormous population whose members have lives barely worth living could be judged better than a smaller population whose members enjoy extremely high quality lives, provided the larger population contains more total well being.
The Average View
The average view holds that the better population is the one with the highest average level of well being.
This avoids some problems with the total view, but it creates others. For example, adding a person with a very happy life could theoretically make the world worse if that person’s well being falls below the existing average.
Person Affecting Views
A person affecting view holds that an outcome can be morally better or worse only if it is better or worse for someone.
Under this approach, creating an additional happy person may not make the world better. If that person never existed, there would be no individual who was deprived of happiness.
This view helps explain why people may have a duty not to create a life dominated by suffering without also having a general duty to create as many happy people as possible.
The Nonidentity Problem
The nonidentity problem arises when a decision affects which particular person will exist.
Suppose a woman can conceive a child now who will have a manageable medical condition or wait several months and conceive a different child without that condition.
The child conceived now may have a life worth living. That child cannot claim that waiting would have made him or her healthier, because waiting would have resulted in a different child existing.
The decision may still appear morally questionable, even though it did not make the resulting child worse off than that same child otherwise would have been. Population ethics asks how an action can be wrong when it harms no particular person in this comparative sense.
Relevance to Abortion
Population ethics becomes relevant to abortion when philosophers ask whether abortion deprives someone of a valuable future or merely prevents a possible future person from existing.
Some arguments treat abortion similarly to a decision not to conceive. If there is no moral duty to create every possible happy person, they argue, there may be no duty to continue every pregnancy.
The pro-life response identifies an important difference:
Before fertilization, no new human organism exists. After fertilization, an individual human organism already exists.
Contraception prevents a possible individual from coming into existence. Abortion ends the life of an individual who has already begun to exist.
Population ethics does not settle whether that existing embryo or fetus possesses full moral status. That question depends on theories of personal identity and personhood. However, it clarifies why preventing conception and ending a pregnancy are not morally equivalent.
Abortion and the Child’s Future
Different approaches to population ethics evaluate the unborn child’s future differently.
The total view may count the happiness the child would probably experience, making abortion a loss of future well being.
A narrow person affecting view may give less weight to that future if it holds that the fetus has no present interests or is not yet the same person who would later experience the life.
The Future Like Ours Argument challenges that conclusion. It holds that the fetus is an existing individual who is deprived of his or her own future by abortion. The issue is not whether society must create an additional person, but whether it may kill an individual who already exists.
Disability and Embryo Selection
Population ethics also appears in decisions involving disability and genetic screening.
Selecting one embryo instead of another may determine which child exists. If the selected child has a disability but a life worth living, it may be difficult to say that the decision harmed that child, since the alternative was that a different child would have existed.
Aborting an already existing child because of a disability raises a different question. The decision does not merely select which person will exist. It ends the life of a particular individual because of a predicted condition.
The pro-life view warns that comparing possible populations should not become a method of ranking the worth of individual human beings according to health, ability, or expected productivity.
Why Population Ethics Matters
Population ethics distinguishes several questions that are often combined:
- Whether there is a duty to create a person
- Whether an existing person may be killed
- Whether a person has been made worse off
- Whether one possible population is better than another
- Whether total or average well being should guide moral decisions
In abortion ethics, the most important distinction is between a person who might have existed and an individual who already exists.
The pro-life position holds that conception marks the beginning of a new human organism. Abortion therefore does not merely prevent a possible life. It ends the life and future of an existing human being.
Major Thinkers
| Thinker | Contribution |
|---|---|
| Derek Parfit | Developed influential accounts of the nonidentity problem and the Repugnant Conclusion |
| Henry Sidgwick | Examined whether utilitarianism should maximize total or average happiness |
| Jan Narveson | Defended the idea that morality should make people happy rather than make additional happy people |
| Jeff McMahan | Examines identity, future interests, and the comparative harm of death |
| Gustaf Arrhenius | Develops and evaluates theories for comparing populations of different sizes |