The Repugnant Conclusion

What Is the Repugnant Conclusion?

The Repugnant Conclusion is a philosophical problem developed by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons.

It arises from the total view of population ethics, which judges one population as better than another when it contains a greater total amount of well-being.

According to this reasoning, a very large population can contain more total well-being than a smaller population even when every person in the larger population has a much lower quality of life.

Parfit’s conclusion was:

For any population whose members have extremely good lives, there could be a much larger population whose lives are barely worth living but whose existence would be judged better overall.

Parfit called this conclusion repugnant because it conflicts with the intuition that a world filled with flourishing people is better than one in which a much larger number of people live just above the threshold of misery.

A Simple Example

Imagine two possible populations:

PopulationNumber of peopleQuality of each lifeTotal well-being
A1 billionExceptionally highHigh
Z100 billionBarely worth livingHigher

No person in Population Z has a life as good as anyone in Population A. However, because Population Z contains so many more people, its total well-being may be greater.

If total well-being is the only standard, Population Z must be judged better.

Many people find that conclusion deeply implausible.

Why the Conclusion Arises

The Repugnant Conclusion follows from several initially reasonable ideas:

  1. Adding people with lives worth living does not make the world worse.
  2. A population with more total well-being is better than one with less.
  3. Small reductions in average quality can be outweighed by adding enough additional worthwhile lives.
  4. Repeating this process eventually produces a vast population whose members have lives barely worth living.

Each step may appear reasonable by itself. Together, they produce the troubling conclusion.

Did Parfit Accept It?

Parfit did not present the Repugnant Conclusion as his preferred vision of society.

He used it to expose a serious problem in population ethics. He searched for a theory that could reject the conclusion without producing other unacceptable results.

The difficulty is that competing theories also have counterintuitive implications:

  • The average view can treat adding a very happy person as bad if that person lowers the existing average.
  • Person-affecting views may struggle to explain why creating people with avoidably poor lives can be wrong when those people still have lives worth living.
  • Minimum-threshold theories must explain where the threshold belongs and why.

Parfit referred to the hoped-for solution as Theory X, but he did not believe he had fully discovered it.

Relevance to Abortion

The Repugnant Conclusion does not directly establish whether abortion is morally permissible.

It does, however, reveal difficulties with evaluating reproduction entirely through total well-being.

If creating additional happy people always improves the world, utilitarian reasoning might appear to imply a general duty to have as many children as possible. Most philosophers reject that conclusion.

Some abortion arguments therefore distinguish between:

  • Creating a person who does not yet exist
  • Continuing the life of an individual who already exists

Before fertilization, declining to conceive does not deprive any identifiable individual of life. After fertilization, the pro-life position holds that a new human organism already exists.

Abortion is therefore not merely a decision about whether to add another person to the population. It concerns whether an existing human being may be killed.

The Pro-Life Perspective

The pro-life position does not require the belief that society must maximize the number of people who exist.

It instead distinguishes two claims:

  1. There is not always a duty to create a new human being.
  2. There is a duty not to intentionally kill an innocent human being who already exists.

This avoids the conclusion that couples must continually reproduce while still recognizing the unborn child’s right to life after conception.

The Repugnant Conclusion also illustrates a broader limitation of judging human life solely by aggregate welfare. Human beings should not be valued merely as units contributing to a population’s total happiness.

A world is not morally better simply because it contains a larger numerical quantity of welfare. Justice, individual rights, relationships, and human dignity must also be considered.

Why the Repugnant Conclusion Matters

The Repugnant Conclusion demonstrates how reasonable assumptions can produce deeply troubling results when human lives are reduced to a calculation of total well-being.

It raises several important questions:

  • Is creating a happy person morally good?
  • Does quantity of life matter more than quality?
  • Can individual rights be reduced to aggregate welfare?
  • Is preventing someone from existing equivalent to harming that person?
  • Should morality make existing people better off or create more people who will be happy?

For pro-life ethics, the most important lesson is that decisions about abortion should not be treated merely as comparisons between possible populations. The central question is whether the unborn child is already an existing individual whose life and future deserve protection.