What Is the Future Like Ours Argument?
The Future Like Ours Argument is a philosophical argument against abortion developed by Don Marquis in his 1989 essay, “Why Abortion Is Immoral.”
Marquis begins by asking why killing an adult human being is normally one of the most serious moral wrongs.
His answer is that killing deprives the victim of everything that would otherwise have formed his or her future:
- Experiences
- Relationships
- Activities
- Enjoyments
- Achievements
- Knowledge
- Personal projects
- Future choices
The primary harm is not that the victim experiences pain or consciously objects at the moment of death. It is that the victim loses the life he or she would otherwise have experienced.
A fetus ordinarily has the same general kind of future ahead of it. Abortion deprives the fetus of that future. Marquis therefore concludes that abortion is presumptively seriously wrong for the same basic reason that killing an adult or child is seriously wrong.
The Argument
The Future Like Ours Argument can be summarized as follows:
- Killing an individual is seriously wrong primarily because it deprives that individual of a valuable future.
- A standard fetus has a valuable future containing experiences, relationships, activities, and enjoyments.
- Abortion deprives the fetus of that future.
- Therefore, abortion is presumptively seriously wrong.
A future like ours does not need to be identical to the life of a typical adult. Its particular contents will differ for every individual.
It may include disability, dependency, medical treatment, limitations, and suffering while still containing relationships, knowledge, enjoyment, and other genuine human goods.
Why Killing Is Wrong
Several explanations have been offered for the wrongness of killing:
- It frustrates the victim’s desire to remain alive.
- It ends the victim’s present consciousness.
- It causes pain or fear.
- It harms the victim’s family and community.
- It violates the rights of a person.
Marquis considers these explanations incomplete.
Killing can remain wrong when the victim is asleep, unconscious, unable to express a desire, or unaware of the danger. It can also be wrong when death is painless and no one else learns about it.
The most fundamental loss is suffered by the individual who is killed. Premature death removes nearly everything that person might have experienced, pursued, learned, or become.
The Argument Does Not Begin With Personhood
Many abortion arguments begin by asking whether the fetus is a person.
Marquis attempts to avoid that dispute. He does not first declare the fetus a person and then infer that abortion is wrong.
Instead, he argues that the fetus possesses the feature that makes killing adults and children wrong: a valuable future.
Marquis argues that the fetus possesses the feature that makes killing adults and children wrong: a valuable future.
If the argument succeeds, one might then conclude that the fetus possesses a right to life. Personhood would be a conclusion rather than the argument’s starting point.
The argument also explains why killing infants is wrong. Newborns cannot reason, understand death, or form mature desires about their futures. They can still be deprived of entire lives that would have been valuable to them.
A Presumption, Not an Absolute Rule
Marquis describes abortion as prima facie, or presumptively, wrong.
This means that depriving the fetus of a valuable future creates a very strong moral reason against abortion.
Marquis compares the presumption against abortion with the presumption against killing an innocent adult. Killing may sometimes be justified, but only for sufficiently serious reasons.
His original argument does not provide a complete analysis of medical emergencies or conflicts between the mother and child. It establishes what he considers a strong presumption against abortion.
The Desire and Sentience Objections
Critics argue that an early fetus cannot be harmed because it has never been conscious, experienced anything, or desired continued life.
Marquis responds that present awareness is not necessary for deprivation.
Present awareness is not necessary for deprivation.
A sleeping person, an unconscious patient, or an infant may not currently think about the future. Killing that individual still removes a life he or she would otherwise have experienced.
Likewise, something can be valuable to an individual before the individual recognizes its value. A suicidal adolescent may believe that life has no value but later experience relationships and achievements that make the future deeply valuable.
The response therefore distinguishes between experiencing a loss and being deprived of something valuable. The unborn child does not need to feel the deprivation at the moment of abortion for the loss to occur.
The Contraception Objection
A common objection claims that if abortion is wrong because it prevents a valuable future, contraception must also be wrong.
Marquis responds that contraception does not deprive an existing individual of a future.
Before fertilization, neither the sperm nor the egg is the organism who would later experience the child’s life. Fertilization produces a new organism with its own developmental trajectory.
There is therefore no single, existing individual who loses a future when conception is prevented.
After fertilization, an identifiable organism exists. Abortion ends the life of that organism and removes the future that would have belonged to it.
The Identity and Potentiality Objections
The argument assumes that the fetus is the same individual who would later experience the valuable future.
Critics who base personal identity on consciousness or psychological continuity reject this assumption. They argue that an early fetus is not yet the person who will later think, remember, and form relationships.
The response appeals to biological continuity.
The embryo is a living human organism who develops continuously through the fetal, infant, child, and adult stages. Consciousness is an ability acquired by that organism, not a new individual who replaces it.
Marquis’s argument is therefore not simply:
The fetus may become a person, so it should receive a person’s rights now.
It is:
The fetus is an existing individual who will be deprived of its own future if killed now.
The central question is whether the embryo and the later conscious person are the same individual. Philosophical analysis of the argument continues to identify this question of numerical identity as one of its central premises.
Disability and an Uncertain Future
No unborn child is guaranteed a long, healthy, or happy life. Illness, disability, injury, or miscarriage may shorten or alter the future the child would otherwise experience.
Uncertainty does not normally eliminate the wrongness of killing. No adult is guaranteed another day, but killing an adult can still deprive that individual of a valuable future.
Uncertainty does not normally eliminate the wrongness of killing. No adult is guaranteed another day, but killing an adult can still deprive that individual of a valuable future.
A valuable future also does not require perfect health, intelligence, independence, or conventional achievement. A person with disabilities may experience love, relationships, knowledge, enjoyment, and meaningful participation in human life.
A valuable future does not require perfect health, intelligence, independence, or conventional achievement.
Bodily Autonomy
The Future Like Ours Argument explains why death harms the fetus. It does not by itself prove that the fetus is entitled to continued use of the woman’s body.
Judith Jarvis Thomson and David Boonin, and the Bodily Autonomy View, argue that abortion may be permissible even if the fetus possesses a right to life. A right to life, they contend, does not automatically include a right to use another person’s body.
A complete pro-life response must add that pregnancy involves a parent and child rather than two strangers, that parents have special obligations toward their children, and that abortion causes the death of a healthy but naturally dependent human being.
Relationship to the Natural Capacity View
The Future Like Ours Argument and the Natural Capacity View often support the same conclusion, but they answer different questions.
| Future Like Ours Argument | Natural Capacity View |
|---|---|
| Explains why killing is harmful | Explains why human beings possess equal dignity |
| Focuses on the future lost through death | Focuses on the kind of being who is killed |
| Grounds the wrongness of abortion in deprivation | Grounds the wrongness of abortion in equal human worth |
| Does not begin with personhood | Identifies rational nature as the basis of personhood |
The arguments can complement each other. The Natural Capacity View explains why the embryo possesses fundamental dignity. The Future Like Ours Argument explains the enormous harm abortion inflicts on that individual.
Why the Future Like Ours Argument Matters
The Future Like Ours Argument changes the central question from:
Is the fetus presently a person?
to:
What does abortion take away from the individual who is killed?
The unborn child may not currently reason, remember, communicate, or desire continued life. But abortion does not merely remove the child’s present experience. It removes every future experience that child would otherwise have had.
Marquis’s argument is influential because it connects abortion with the reason ordinary killing is so serious. Killing is not wrong only because of what the victim can do at the moment of death. It is wrong because of everything the victim loses.