The Immediately Exercisable Capacity View

The capacity-based personhood view holds that being a living human organism does not automatically make someone a person with a full right to life. Instead, personhood depends upon possessing certain mental or psychological capacities.

Commonly proposed capacities include:

  • Consciousness
  • Reasoning
  • Self-awareness
  • Communication
  • The ability to form desires
  • An understanding of oneself as continuing through time
  • The ability to make plans for the future

Under this view, an embryo or fetus may be biologically human while not yet qualifying as a person in the morally important sense.

Human Being Versus Person

Supporters of this view distinguish between two categories:

TermMeaning within the view
Human beingA biological member of the human species
PersonA being with the psychological capacities required for strong moral rights

This distinction allows someone to agree that human life begins at fertilization while denying that every human being has an equal right to life.

The central abortion question therefore becomes not simply, “Is the unborn human?” but, “Does the unborn child possess the capacities required for personhood?”

Mary Anne Warren’s Criteria

Philosopher Mary Anne Warren proposed several traits associated with personhood:

  1. Consciousness, particularly the capacity to experience pain
  2. Reasoning
  3. Self-motivated activity
  4. The ability to communicate
  5. Self-awareness

Warren did not argue that every person must perfectly display every characteristic. Her position was that an unborn child displays too few of them to possess the same moral status as an established person.

Because the pregnant woman is clearly a person under these standards, Warren concluded that her rights outweigh those of a fetus that does not yet qualify as one.

Michael Tooley’s Self-Consciousness View

Michael Tooley places particular importance on self-consciousness and desires. He argues that having a right to continued life requires some awareness of oneself as a continuing subject capable of having interests or desires about the future.

An early fetus has no conscious desire to continue living and no concept of itself as an individual existing through time. Tooley therefore concludes that it does not possess the same right to life as a self-aware person.

Unlike many defenders of abortion, Tooley acknowledges that this reasoning can extend beyond birth. Because newborns also lack developed self-consciousness, he has controversially argued that abortion and at least some cases of infanticide are not fundamentally different in moral terms.

Not every capacity-based theorist accepts that conclusion. Some argue that newborns should be protected because of family relationships, social practices, developing capacities, or the interests of others.

Present and Future Capacities

An important disagreement concerns what it means to “have” a capacity.

An adult who is sleeping or temporarily unconscious cannot presently reason or exercise self-awareness. Nevertheless, most capacity theorists would say that the adult retains those abilities in an immediately available or previously developed form.

An embryo has not yet developed the organs needed to exercise consciousness. However, the embryo possesses an internal developmental capacity to form those organs and eventually think, reason, and become self-aware.

The debate is therefore between two standards:

  • Present or immediately exercisable capacity: Rights depend upon abilities that already function or can presently be exercised.
  • Basic or natural capacity: Rights belong to the kind of being whose nature includes developing and exercising those abilities, even when development is incomplete.

The capacity-based personhood view usually emphasizes the first. The substance or endowment view emphasizes the second.

Why the View Is Attractive

The capacity-based view attempts to explain why persons possess especially strong moral rights. Consciousness and self-awareness appear morally important because they allow someone to experience harm, value life, form relationships, and pursue goals.

It also avoids treating every living human cell as a person. Skin cells are biologically human, but they are not conscious individuals and cannot develop into mature human beings through their own coordinated growth.

The key question, however, is whether mental functioning creates human worth or merely expresses abilities belonging to an already-existing human being.

The Pro-Life Critique

It Makes Equality Depend on Performance

Mental abilities exist in degrees. Some people are more intelligent, self-aware, communicative, or independent than others.

If developed capacities create personhood, it becomes difficult to explain why people with greater capacities do not possess greater fundamental rights. The view risks making human dignity dependent upon performance rather than something every human being possesses equally.

If developed capacities create personhood, it becomes difficult to explain why people with greater capacities do not possess greater fundamental rights.

It Threatens Vulnerable Human Beings

Newborns cannot reason, understand themselves across time, or make plans for the future. People with profound cognitive disabilities may never exercise some of these abilities. Patients under anesthesia, in temporary comas, or with advanced dementia may also lack them temporarily or permanently.

Capacity theorists propose different ways of protecting these individuals. Critics argue, however, that these protections can appear secondary or indirect if the individuals do not qualify as persons in their own right.

The Threshold Can Be Arbitrary

Human psychological development is gradual. Consciousness, memory, communication, and self-awareness do not appear fully developed at one precise moment.

Any chosen threshold raises difficult questions:

  • Which capacities are required?
  • How developed must they be?
  • How should they be measured?
  • Why should that particular level create a right to life?
  • What happens when the capacity is lost?

The pro-life view argues that fertilization provides a clearer boundary because it marks the beginning of a new human organism rather than an arbitrarily selected level of performance.

It Confuses Having an Ability with Exercising It

An embryo cannot presently think, but neither is the embryo a passive object that might someday be turned into a human being. The embryo is already a human organism actively developing the structures through which rational abilities will later be expressed.

Pro-life philosophers therefore distinguish the embryo from sperm, eggs, and ordinary body cells. A sperm or egg is part of another organism and cannot develop into an adult independently. After fertilization, the resulting embryo is a new organism directing his or her own continuous development.

Capacity View Versus Substance View

Capacity-based viewSubstance or endowment view
Personhood depends upon developed mental capacitiesPersonhood belongs to every human being
Moral status may emerge graduallyBasic human worth is present from fertilization
Biological humanity alone is insufficientBeing a human organism grounds equal dignity
Current functioning is morally centralNatural capacity and underlying identity are morally central
Early abortion does not kill a personAbortion kills the same individual who would later exercise mature abilities

Central Point of Disagreement

The disagreement is not primarily about whether an embryo can presently think or feel. Both sides recognize that an early embryo cannot exercise those abilities.

The disagreement is about why human beings have rights. Capacity-based theorists ground strong rights in developed mental functioning. Pro-life substance-view thinkers ground those rights in the human being who possesses and gradually develops those capacities.

The pro-life objection is that human rights are safest when they belong to every human being, not only to those currently able to demonstrate particular abilities.

Associated Thinkers

  • Mary Anne Warren: Proposed consciousness, reasoning, self-directed activity, communication, and self-awareness as central indicators of personhood.
  • Michael Tooley: Connected the right to life with self-consciousness and the ability to desire one’s continued existence.
  • Peter Singer: Distinguishes membership in the human species from personhood and gives moral importance to consciousness, preferences, and self-awareness.
  • Jeff McMahan: Connects moral status and the harm of death to psychological development and an individual’s connection to a future self.
  • Christopher Kaczor: Criticizes performance-based personhood and defends an endowment account under which every human being possesses basic dignity.