The Responsibility and Consent View

What Is the Responsibility and Consent View?

The Responsibility and Consent View holds that a person does not automatically become obligated to remain pregnant merely because she voluntarily had sex.

Supporters distinguish three ideas:

  • Choosing an action
  • Accepting that the action carries a risk
  • Consenting to a possible result

A person may choose sex while attempting to prevent pregnancy. According to this view, recognizing that contraception can fail does not mean consenting to pregnancy or agreeing to continue one.

The view also challenges the claim that causing a fetus to exist necessarily gives that fetus a right to remain in the pregnant woman’s body. It therefore focuses less on whether the fetus is a person and more on how demanding bodily obligations are acquired.

Consent to Sex Is Not Consent to Pregnancy

Supporters argue that consent must be specific. Consent to one activity does not ordinarily count as consent to every foreseeable consequence of that activity.

For example, driving involves accepting the risk of an accident, but a driver does not consent to being injured. Similarly, having sex may involve accepting a risk of pregnancy without consenting to become or remain pregnant.

Contraceptive use can make this distinction especially clear. A couple using contraception is acting specifically to prevent pregnancy. If pregnancy nevertheless occurs, supporters argue that it contradicts their intentions rather than fulfilling something to which they agreed.

Some defenders extend this reasoning even to sex without contraception. They maintain that knowingly taking a risk is still not identical to consenting to the outcome.

Thomson’s People Seeds

Judith Jarvis Thomson illustrates this position with her “people seeds” thought experiment.

Imagine that microscopic people seeds drift through the air and can take root in a person’s carpet. The homeowner installs protective screens, but one screen fails and a seed takes root. Thomson asks whether opening the window, despite knowing the small risk, gives the resulting person an enforceable right to remain in the home.

The analogy represents consensual sex, contraception, and unintended pregnancy. Thomson argues that taking reasonable precautions does not necessarily amount to granting another person the right to use one’s body.

Responsibility for Creating Dependency

A major objection is that pregnancy differs from Thomson’s analogies because the parents caused the child to exist in a dependent condition.

David Boonin responds by distinguishing between causing someone to become needy and causing someone to exist while naturally needing assistance.

Suppose a person injures someone who was previously healthy. The person may owe compensation because the victim was made worse off. But conception does not make an already existing person dependent. It creates a new individual whose dependency is part of that individual’s original condition.

Boonin therefore argues that causing a fetus to exist does not by itself establish an obligation to provide bodily support. The fetus has not been harmed by being conceived, since its alternative was not an independent life but nonexistence.

Parental Obligations

The Responsibility and Consent View usually treats parental responsibility as something that must be voluntarily assumed or justified independently of biological parenthood.

Thomson suggests that people can acquire special obligations when they choose to take responsibility for a child. Parents who bring a baby home and undertake its care cannot simply abandon the child. However, she denies that every pregnant woman has automatically assumed that parental role.

Supporters also distinguish financial or social obligations from bodily obligations. A parent may be required to provide money, food, shelter, or substitute care, but the law generally does not compel parents to donate blood, marrow, or organs to their children.

From this perspective, pregnancy is an unusually intimate and demanding form of bodily assistance. Biological parenthood alone may not be enough to make that assistance compulsory.

Contraception and Rape

Contraception strengthens the view because it provides evidence that the couple did not intend or consent to pregnancy. The failure of a preventive measure does not, supporters argue, transform an unwanted outcome into an accepted obligation.

Pregnancy resulting from rape presents the clearest case. The woman neither consented to sex nor voluntarily accepted its risks. Any account based solely on responsibility for voluntary sexual activity therefore cannot explain why she would be obligated to continue the pregnancy.

For this reason, the Responsibility and Consent View is broader than an argument about avoiding consequences. Its central claim is that bodily obligations require stronger justification than biological causation or foreseeable risk alone.

The Pro Life Response

Responsibility Does Not Always Require Consent

The pro life response begins by distinguishing consent from responsibility.

People frequently acquire obligations they did not intend to acquire. A driver who unintentionally injures someone may owe assistance or compensation even though the driver never consented to the accident. The absence of consent to a consequence does not necessarily eliminate responsibility for responding to it.

From this perspective, saying “I did not consent to pregnancy” may accurately describe a person’s intention, but it does not settle whether obligations arose once a child came into existence.

Creating a Naturally Dependent Child Can Create Duties

Pro life philosophers also reject the claim that responsibility applies only when someone makes an independently existing person worse off.

Parents create children in a naturally immature and dependent condition. That dependency is not an accident imposed upon the child after conception. It is an unavoidable feature of every human life at its earliest stages.

The fact that a newborn was never previously independent does not remove the parents’ responsibility to feed, shelter, and protect the newborn. Critics argue that the same principle applies before birth: causing a child to exist in a dependent state can generate duties precisely because the child cannot survive without care.

Parenthood Begins Before It Is Chosen

The pro life view generally holds that parental obligations arise from the parent and child relationship, not solely from a decision to accept the child.

A father may owe support even if he did not intend conception or agree to become a parent. Parents cannot ordinarily eliminate their obligations merely by declaring that they never consented to parenthood.

If the fetus is already the parents’ child, critics argue that its basic claims should not depend entirely on whether the parents wanted or formally accepted the relationship.

Pregnancy Is Not Organ Donation

Pro life thinkers question comparisons between pregnancy and forced organ donation.

Organ donation generally involves using part of one person’s body to rescue an unrelated individual from disease or injury. Pregnancy involves a parent sustaining her own child through the ordinary biological process appropriate to that child’s age.

The fetus is not dying because an organ has failed. It is healthy but naturally dependent. Abortion also differs from declining to rescue because it ordinarily involves an action intended to end fetal life.

These differences do not make pregnancy easy or insignificant. They do, however, challenge the claim that gestation is morally equivalent to donating an organ to a stranger.

Contraception Changes Intention, Not the Child’s Rights

Using contraception clearly indicates an intention to avoid pregnancy. The pro life response does not need to deny that fact.

Instead, it maintains that intentions before conception cannot determine the rights of the child who later exists. Once a human being has been conceived, the child’s moral status cannot depend on whether contraception was used successfully, unsuccessfully, or not at all.

Contraception may reduce responsibility for becoming pregnant, but it does not necessarily remove responsibility toward the child after conception.

Rape Reveals the Limits of Responsibility Based Reasoning

In pregnancies caused by rape, the woman did not voluntarily participate in the act that caused conception. Arguments based on accepting the risks of sex therefore do not apply.

The pro life position must rest here on a different foundation: the humanity and moral status of the unborn child. The father’s crime does not change the identity or value of the child conceived.

This does not minimize the violence committed against the woman. A pro life response should demand serious emotional, medical, financial, and legal support for her while placing guilt entirely on the perpetrator.

The Central Disagreement

QuestionResponsibility and Consent ViewPro Life Response
Does consent to sex include consent to pregnancy?No. Consent must be specific.Not necessarily, but duties can arise without consent.
Does causing conception create parental obligations?Not automatically. Causation alone is insufficient.Yes, creating a dependent child can establish duties of care.
Is pregnancy comparable to bodily donation?Yes. Both require bodily support that normally requires consent.No. Pregnancy is parental care for a naturally dependent child.
What about pregnancy from rape?It strongly supports the absence of an obligation to gestate.The child’s value does not depend on the circumstances of conception.

Why This View Matters

The Responsibility and Consent View identifies a question that fetal personhood alone does not answer: even if the fetus is a person, why is another person required to sustain it?

Its strength is that it takes bodily autonomy and the burdens of pregnancy seriously. It also explains why unwanted pregnancy cannot simply be described as something a woman chose.

Its central weakness, from a pro life perspective, is that it treats pregnancy too much like assistance between strangers. If the fetus is the woman’s child, then biological parenthood, causal responsibility, and the child’s natural dependency may establish obligations that do not depend on continuing consent.

The deepest disagreement is therefore not whether pregnancy was intended. It is whether parental responsibility begins when a child comes into existence or only when the parent voluntarily accepts the parental role.